

# THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

*A Monthly Journal of Philosophy*

DECEMBER, 1927

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## A Singapore of Thought

Charles M. O'Hara

## Entropy—The End of Life

Bernard J. Wuellner

## Impressions of Minor Logic

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## Mr. Dewey's Epistemology

Leo C. Brown

## The Sequence of Philosophic Studies

*An Editorial*

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# THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

*Published monthly from October to May  
by the Students of the School of Philosophy*

of

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

ST. LOUIS, MO.



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VOL. IV. A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY NO. 3.

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## *The Sequence of Philosophic Studies*



he order in which the various departments of Scholastic Philosophy are presented in most of the manuals, namely, Logic, and Ontology, Cosmology and Psychology, Theodicy and Ethics, has been the subject of not a little controversy of late years.

The Bulletin of the National Catholic Educational Association for November, 1927, contains, among other papers read at the Detroit meeting, one on this matter. Reverend Rudolph Bandas, of St. Paul Seminary, the author, makes a strong attack on the sequence which would place Ontology before Cosmology and Psychology.

Such an order of presentation, he affirms, does indeed make conspicuous the logical consistency of the Scholastic system, and it yields that satisfaction of mind which always accompanies grand deduction. Moreover, everyone will admit that it is a perfectly scientific method of summarizing the conclusions of philosophy. The question is, does it



accord with sound pedagogical principles to follow the same order in teaching the subject. The question has been raised by some of the most eminent modern Scholastics, and such authorities as the Dominicans, Garrigou-Lagrange and Hugon, the Benedictine, Krebs, the Jesuit, Geny, Maritain, of the Catholic Institute of Paris, and Mercier, of Louvain have unhesitatingly declared it their opinion that Ontology should be studied after the so-called Special Metaphysical treatises, Theodicy alone excepted.

As the question is evidently a live issue among the leaders of Scholastic thought, it may not be out of place to summarize the case against the generally accepted sequence as a basis for possible discussion by experienced teachers in later issues of THE SCHOOLMAN. The group referred to above contends in the main that the General Metaphysics-Special Metaphysics order is an artificial one, that it militates against the proper understanding of the roles of philosophy and science, nay, even of the Peripatetic system itself, and that it is not historically the method of the medieval Catholic philosophers but a pure adoption from the non-Scholastic, Wolff, in the 18th century.

It is unnatural, they say, <sup>to apply</sup> oneself to the study of the most abstract of concepts in Ontology before considering the less abstract, more tangible problems of the world and life. The truly philosophical method is always a transition from the better known to the less well known, and the truly psychological procedure, an ascension from the sensible to the purely intellectual. The natural order, then, suggests that the first object of study be the sensible world in its proximate causes (natural science), the second, the sensible world in its ultimate causes (natural philosophy), and, finally, the most abstract of all notions, being as such, and its transcendental principles. This is the via inventionis; and in this case, it should also be the via doctrinae.

When the study of natural philosophy is taken up after that of Ontology, the passage from the regions of the abstract to the concrete is calculated to give rise to a distorted notion of the role of philosophy in the realm of knowledge, as something, namely, that is thought out independently of all experience, and into which, as into a mold, experience itself must somehow or other be made to fit. The sequence of studies for Aristotle and St. Thomas, for all the Scholastics until the 18th century, was: Logic - General Natural Philosophy, the object of which was ens mobile - Special Natural Philosophy, comprising the treatises, de Coelo et Mundo, de Generatione et Corruptione, and de Anima. Then only came the study of metaphysics, the object of which was ens in quantum ens. Wolff, who first introduced the analytical arrangement of the parts of philosophy, was a disciple of Leibniz, and, as such, of an aprioristic, mathematical temper. The consideration of General before Special Metaphysics was most satisfactory to his deductive genius. It may seem equally so to many Scholastic Philosophers, once they have completed the course and attained to a certain familiarity with its doctrines. It is different to one taking his initial steps in the study. For him it is no question of having a row of convenient pigeon-holes to hold his knowledge, so arranged that the subordination of part to part is brought out at a glance. His task is the very apprehension of the principles, and the more natural a posteriori order would certainly seem to make this easier.

Father Bandas gives as an example the doctrine of act and potency, the very heart of the Scholastic system. To be properly understood, he contends, this

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# IMPRESSIONS of MINOR LOGIC

By Calvert Alexander

The modern distrust of logic, the literateur's reaction against it, and the sensible attitude to take, are some of the questions entertainingly discussed in this article.

It is our initial contribution from the halls of First Year.



It is said of Socrates that he brought philosophy down from heaven to inhabit among men; and I shall be ambitious to have it said of me that I have brought philosophy out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea tables and coffee houses. -Addison.

After a few weeks of conceptus subjectivus and objectivus, the conviction with which one may have begun the study of philosophy - that there is really no difference between it and literature - begins to become less a conviction and more a matter of hope. One is assured as the year begins that the best poetry and drama is full of philosophy, that the Greeks, Plato and Pindar, called all poets and that with the Romans letters and philosophy were inseparable. But very soon the fact that we don't recall having run across sub-contradictions in Homer or Shelley begins a chain of suspicions tending to end in the conclusion that there is really no difference between philosophy and mathematics but for the fact that we have not yet seen the whole of philosophy. What we do conclude is that minor logic certainly bears a closer relation to algebra than to poetry.

This is the first disillusionment. There are others. A reaction to the idea of making one's thoughts conform to a "quadratic equation" is felt by many. That such restraint should be placed upon the noblest faculty chafes and breeds rebellion against the whole machinery of logic. There is the learning of terms that have no counterpart in the native tongue, and which are redolent of monasteries and other unscientific things. Finally, there is the knowledge that to this generation a distinction is a quibble, and the syllogism, an engine of deception. And this does not help matters.

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Several weeks ago, I happened to be sitting in the local room of a certain metropolitan newspaper. My companion was a second year philosopher with the rather questionable reputation of having distinguished himself in minor logic the previous year. The conversation turned from commonplaces to religion.

"What I can't understand", said the newspaper man we were visiting, "is why the Catholic Church makes such a fuss about these murderers, Sacco and Vanzetti, and does so little to save me who have never murdered anyone".

Out of the corner of my eye I could see my philosopher friend girding himself for the fray. Here was a syllogism. Would he distinguish the major, or nego suppositum?"



Looking back on the matter, I can see that there were many distinctions possible to the trained logician. To the practical philosopher there was only one - and he found it.

"By the way", he said, "were you ever baptized?"

The journalist replied that he had never been. Twenty-five words of simple English on the Church's doctrine of the distinction between an unbaptized person and an adopted son of God, and the disputation ended with a I-never-looked-at-it-that-way-before.

I was immensely impressed. My conclusions were something like this: If minor logic does this for one who gives himself heart and soul to it, perhaps it's not so much of a penitentiary sentence as it seems.

And so the conviction that a little mathematics is not out of place in reasoning grows. Of course, in press rooms, Bohemian restaurants, and other places where the big problems of life are reviewed and settled, the Porphyrian tree is a strange bush, and "untrammelled" reason has the floor. But when the whistle blows these philosophers into the commercial houses along the market-place and the talk turns to money, it will be noticed that everything that can be reduced to a formula is reduced and system takes the place of disorder. Why is this? Why is it that the engineer who insists so strongly on the geometric principle of identity is sure to gripe at the same principle when it appears in a syllogism at the club.

The enthusiasm for logic increases with the recognition that the popular suspicion of a rigid system in reasoning is groundless. Our own misgivings disappear and the impulse is to despise the opinion of the many. But this does not seem to be altogether correct. However, convinced we are of the necessity of the rule of minor logic for arriving at, and testing truth for our own use, we can never forget that the prejudice of the world to this system is a reality and must be reckoned with. The time is not at hand when a public appeal to Barbara and Celarent can be made. This is gibberish to our generation and we can understand its point of view if we remember our own reaction to these things before we saw them all worked out with a mathematical thoroughness. The day may come when the perfection of this system will be re-discovered by the world; but it is not here yet. In the seclusion of our minds, then, we shall submit what seems to be true to the syllogism; we shall distinguish the distinguishable, and counter-distinguish the counter-distinguishable - but privately. The result of these operations we shall translate into every-day speech.

There are probably very few first year philosophers who have not concluded, at one time or another, that Scholastic Philosophy would be made more palatable to the world and less mysterious to the student if it were taught in English. The big obstacle to bringing philosophy out of the book-cases and schools, in these moments, seems to be Latin. Those who have ever studied logic in English, however, as the present writer has, realize that this is a mirage, and concluded that the hard thing to swallow is not the language but the frigid mathematics of the system, which translation into English does not make less frigid or less mathematical. They find no comfort in the thought that if "this stuff were only in English we could make some headway". Nor do they imagine that the Anglicising of it would make it less unpopular at tea tables and coffee houses, at clubs and assemblies. For they realize that the prejudice against Scholasticism and its logic is to a large extent historical. It began during the Renaissance, which, they know, was not a

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# ENTROPY, the END of LIFE

By Bernard J. Wuellner

**S**ir Oliver Lodge in a recent paper only a little less sensational than that of Sir Arthur Keith on Evolution, propounded his own cosmogony. This is the first of two articles by Mr. Wuellner designed to show why entropy was Sir Oliver's chief problem.

**T**he facts of entropy sketch a far different picture of the end of the universe than that which we draw from scripture or from Dryden's words, "When the last and dreadful hour This crumbling pageant shall devour." Yet this prophecy of smoldering ruin seems to apply rather to the earth which is destined to end long before the universe shall die.

Now this comparison with death is quite apt. For as all life together with the spirit's activity leaves the corpse while the material of the body remains, so in the universe. We do not say that the material of the universe shall vanish into nothing unless, indeed, God should cease to conserve it; nor may we say that God could not operate to revive the world or to anticipate its end. We speak only of an unin-

interrupted natural course by which, as reason based on science teaches, all life shall disappear from the whole of this tremendous creation and a state of rigid, mortal cold shall settle down upon a shadowed world when all the energy of the spheres shall have been transformed into uniformly distributed heat.

All scientists, whether theists, evolutionists, atheists, or pantheists, agree to this fact that entropy is sending the heavens to their doom. While some of them for various reasons are anxious to escape this bitter fate and have excogitated theories to restore world energies (as we shall see in the next issue of this journal), yet all unite in saying that, as far as we can see, the world shall someday be nowhere able to sustain life. Our multiplied inventions and thrifty efficiency can but delay the race to the tomb.

To scholastics entropy has decided apologetic force. If the universe had no beginning and yet is to end, surely a universe that has not yet ended despite its eternal start is the greatest of contradictions and paradoxes. Each day it advances the process of its own suicide, though gross evolutionists have named the world the only God. Hence, those who deny God and Man's immortality are much disturbed by entropy, and stumble into oddly pockmarked logic in their effort to dodge its facts. Pantheism becomes the great buffoon of philosophy if this world which is God shall cease its activity and shall lose all its attributes of life, beauty, and order. Creative evolution with its glossy talk of our approach to the peak of material perfection is hammered to powder under the strong strokes of fact. How vain it is to apotheosize our puny civilization which is hurtling to such world-wide paralysis. Not least of all, entropy, like a powerful lens, focusses philosophy and science: scholastic caution not to contradict scientific fact and scientific deception in the face of fact. We see grave scientists argue that the world IS coming to an end; but, it MAY not come to an end; therefore, it IS NOT coming to an end.



With these notions of the importance of the subject we may begin a more intimate study of entropy. Entropy is concerned with energy, that aptitude or capacity of matter for work. Without energy machinery stands idle, life is impossible, the universe halts. Life is not energy, for it cannot be transformed into other kinds of energy as light, heat, sound, rotation, vibration, elastic strain, gravitative separation, electric currents, and chemical affinity can be converted from one state to another, nor does life add energy to our sum.

Properly speaking, entropy is not a law, but a fact deduced from the laws and facts of energy and its operations. Entropy is a ratio of the useful to the total energy in the world. Since the unavailable energy in the world is ever increasing, this ratio constantly approaches the ratio of zero to unity, 0:1. We say that the time is coming when all energy will be so evenly distributed that none of it will be at our disposal for work. A synopsis of some facts referring to energy will make clear the progress of the discussion.

1. The total sum of energy in the world is a definite, limited quantity which no natural agency can increase.
2. Energy cannot act unless the energetic agent has a higher heat level than the energized subject.
3. Heat is the last stable form assumed by all other forms of energy.
4. Heat tends to diffuse and thus establish a uniform temperature.
5. Heat is constantly diffusing itself everywhere through space and from fact 4, tends toward uniform diffusion throughout the universe.
6. Heat thus diffused is no longer available for work.
7. When uniform diffusion of heat is accomplished throughout the universe, all activity, and most especially, all life must cease.

Our first fact stands upon the firm experimental certainty of the principle of the conservation of energy, which - universally applied - says that our universe is a closed system with a given supply of energy that will not diminish nor increase through any known natural cause. Yet the energy may assume a variable form and distribution. In its present variety and allocation of forms it is the physical cause of all world activity. But because of constant change of form, even the wonderful supply of world energy is becoming useless.

Fact second above is but an expression of the second law of heat whereby we learn that no work can be done between two bodies of the same temperature. When a condition of heat equilibrium is reached work ceases. Such a condition of heat balance is overtaking us.

None of us have failed to observe the third fact we have noted. For in every operation and every transformation of energy some heat is evolved. Now in some engines we want heat; in others we take careful measures to eliminate the heat produced. In either case some heat appears as wasted energy which radiates into the air and thence into space. We know in many machines just how much energy is lost in heat. Few machines reach an efficiency of 20%; human muscles are not more than 25% efficient; the famous Diesel engine attains an average of but 37%. The other 63 to 80 or more percent vanishes as a veritable fairy, here for a minute and then gone forever.

But not only organisms, not only machines dissipate energy, but each happening in the universe drains the total stock of remaining valuable energy.



All energy is ultimately reduced to heat, and heat radiated at random cannot be reconverted into other energizing channels. Everything ministers to entropy, - every click on this typewriter, every twitch at the dentist's, chasing the fire departments, holiday touring, jazz players serving their rude tonic to raw nerves. The universe bends low as entropy's slave. Have we any bins into which we have crammed all the light, heat, sound, effort of the past along with all the operations of organic life? The earth is truly prodigal of its energies and incalculably rich in its stores. But remember when all its energy is fled, it has no new stock room. Cold space like cold death will one day strangle us.

In all our literature the sun has become a symbol even of the mighty energy of God. But the sun, too, skips toward dissolution. Our earth harvests but  $\frac{1}{2}$  billionth of the sun's output; the whole solar system gathers in a tiny  $\frac{1}{100}$  millionth of its sun's strength. Even this paltry bit we waste and radiate into space in our own turn. "We need only the merest crumbs, but if the spend-thrift goes bankrupt even the crumbs will cease." Where does it all go? The parsecs of the skies swallow it up.

Enlarge the scale by this picture of Canon Sheehan: "Space is a universe of darkness, the mark of midnight, and cold, pierced here and there by suns, which, though to our imaginations they are colossal and gigantic, are nevertheless pinpoints of light in the vast deserts around them." The heavens are populated by millions of suns which scorn the shallow splendor of our own sun. Yet who of us would be willing to exchange the energy of our own sun for the total expenditure of energy which we actually receive from these foreign systems. The November Scientific American states that Andromeda is easily more than 850,000 light years away. It must have been shining that long if its light were to reach us. Perhaps these most remote orbs are already extinct while we still catch glimpses of their aged light. Surely there has been a big run on the energy banks of the universe. Is there no bottom to the banker's pocketbook? Such untold wealth staggers us. But man's life is but a dot in space and time. These vast stellar masses are themselves "pinpoints in a vast desert", yet they have dared so long recklessly to squander their energies. The pinpoints have vainly striven to warm farflung arctic deserts of space. And if it is true, as some recent French experiments indicate, that the speed of light is decreasing at a rate of four kilometers per second each year, then entropy will perhaps overtake us far sooner than we had supposed.

We stand somewhat bewildered at this idea of lost energy because it is so much like an annihilation of energy. For practical purposes this escaped energy though actually existing might as well be destroyed. Some little bit of the stream reaches other warm matter like our earth and sun; another fraction of it is picked up by the cold matter, extinct suns, and cosmic dust that is surely very plentiful out beyond; but most of it continues forever in motion along the ether waves, journeying nowhere, effecting no good; so that we may say that it is eventually absorbed in the ether of space. How very cold this extinct matter and limitless space must be if even the upper strata of our air have such biting temperatures despite warming by the sun and re-radiation from the earth. The aviator will suggest to you something of the cold out where the only heat comes from the stray discarded calories of other "pinpoints."

So the time must come when the universe shall reach an equilibrium of heat at a point not much above absolute zero. All the world's energies will be

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# REVIEWS

MIND AND PERSONALITY An Essay in Psychology and Philosophy,

By William Brown, M.D., D.Sc.

G.F. Putnam's Son, New York. \$ 2.50

DOCTOR William Brown is eminently well-fitted for the attempt to obtain a synoptic view of personality, as considered from the standpoint of the various sciences - especially from those of psychology, psycho-pathology, and philosophy. Doctor Brown is a practicing psychotherapist in London who travels to Oxford several times a week during the school-term to lecture on Philosophy.

In much that Doctor Brown writes we seem to find traces of a Scholastic mind at work without, of course, the terminology of the Schools. Personality as it is understood in this volume is convertible with the Scholastic term, character. Personality, as treated in our manuals in General Metaphysics, finds no place in this work.

In the chapter on "Mind and the Nervous System" there is an admirable refutation of materialism and parallelism. Materialism as a theory is generally objected to on the grounds that it denies mental activity; whereas parallelism, or as it is here called, interactionism, is held to be no explanation at all. Parallelism merely states a problem and postulates a miracle that mind and matter in all its complicated actions and reactions should be perfectly co-ordinated. Metaphysics we are glad to note, drives Doctor Brown towards Vitalism and Voluntarism. His attitude is not so firm and clear as we should wish to see from a scholar of Doctor Brown's ability.

"It possibly makes little difference in Psychotherapy whether materialism is correct, or whether voluntarism is more correct; though one finds such a distinguished neurologist as Dejerine saying in his book on Psychotherapy that belief in freedom is essential to the more successful applications of the methods of Psychotherapy. He claims, practically at any rate, that we must believe in freedom if we are to hope to influence our patients on the mental side. Without going so far as that, I am inclined to say that belief in freedom, in self-determination, on the physician's part strongly enough to sustain or originate a similar belief in the patient's mind, is a very important factor in mental cure" (pp. 48 & 49)

Doctor Brown is to be congratulated on his chapters on mystical experiences. He is very respectful towards Catholic sensibilities in the presentation of his data. While we should have to part company with him when his explanations become merely naturalistic, still, we cannot refrain from commending the scholarly and sympathetic attitude taken towards the Catholic Mind in those matters.

In the chapter on Psycho-Analysis, Freudianism assumes the lion's share of the treatment, the theories of Jung and Adler receiving the barest outlines. Doctor Brown does not incorporate into his own theories the objectionable features of the Unconscious philosopher of the Unconscious.

In chapter the seventeenth, on Plato and Aristotle, the author fails to get past the elementary doctrines of Aristotle on Ethics and Personality as we



find them in the Nichomachean Ethics and all the Platonian lore is based on the Socratic or Early Dialogues. Many authors, Dr. Brown included, got dwarfed notions of Platonism because they fail to rectify their ideas obtained from the earlier dialogues by the light of those dialogues which careful study in chronological stylometry has proved to be the offspring of Plato's maturer judgement.

P. F. S.

ART AND INSTINCT, by S. Alexander. Oxford University Press  
American Branch, New York. Aug. 1927.

**P**ROFESSOR Alexander of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Manchester on May the twenty-third of this year delivered a lecture commemorative of the work of Herbert Spencer on the Subject "Art and Instinct". Professor Alexander, at the very outset, wards off any possible objection to the linking of a rational pursuit such as art with a mere animal instinct. Building upon an analogy which he fabricates from a passage in the Nichomachean Ethics, Professor Alexander maintains that his theory is in keeping with the whole Aristotelian doctrine of virtue which arises out of the natural passion; just as true courage arises out of animal courage which proceeds from anger or pain.

To familiarize the reader with the historical back-ground of this particular problem of Aesthetics, the lecturer traces for us the attitude of the English philosophical mind on this subject up to the present time. Professor Alexander asserts that the merit of the past has been in the appeal to the instincts as a basis of art, but that the really relevant instinct has not as yet been identified. Leaving Hume, Kant and Adam Smith as untrustworthy guides, Alexander follows a hint of McDougall in treating constructiveness as an instinct. The constructive instinct is illustrated by the dam-building of the beaver, the hive-making of the bee, the song of the male nightingale and the nest-building of the rook. The main thesis of the monograph appears to be that in art man gives full, conscious play to that instinct which guides the beaver, the bee, the nightingale and the rook in their functions.

Possible attacks by dualists on the grounds of materialistic evolution, which might have been thought an inevitable sequel to such a treatise are neatly warded off by Prof. Alexander by well guarded distinctions.

Waiving aside all minor differences, the chief objection to assigning constructiveness as the basic instinct of art would be that, in this supposition, there could be no art for the non-creator. This merely active instinct does not take into account a passive element in man for the enjoyment of the beauty of another man's genius and creation.

While we realize we see but a shadow and hear but a faint echo of the beauty that must have been in the minds of the mastercraftsmen like Beethoven, Pinder and deVinci as they worked at their inspired compositions, still their works in the fine arts stimulate in us an aesthetic experience which, though producing nothing original and creative, is more than merely passive and may be truly called the expression of an artistic instinct.

P. F. S.



# A SINGAPORE OF THOUGHT

By Charles M. O'Hara

Using the unrivaled geographical importance of Singapore as an illustration, Mr. O'Hara in this essay draws attention to a similar vantage ground in the field of thought. This he believes to be The Philosophy of Education.



WHEN the tropic sun rises upon a world-cruise steamship easing to its wharf at Singapore, it will usually outline many a traveller eagerly drinking in a first view of the hovels and palaces of this fabled spot. Singapore, with its strategic position on the main artery of world commerce, built upon the cast off refuse of its fifty steamship lines, teeming with the flotsam and jetsam of the human kind, and exhaling a fevered breath of evils and spices and tears is a never-to-be-forgotten experience in the life of any globe-trotter. But for him who takes his travelling seriously and is eager to obtain a comparative view of the various races of man, to know their differences, their good and bad points, there is no better course than to stand in the mart of Singapore and let his eyes drift over the busy sea of bobbing fezzes and dusky turbans.

A cross section gives us the most interesting view of any piece of complicated machinery. Singapore gives a cross section of the human race. Mongolians and Malaysians, Burmese and Polynesians, bronzed Aryans and their paler brothers all meet and mingle at Singapore. Songs of nations and weird philosophies of distant lands are woven into a cosmopolitan spirit in which every grade of moral uprightness and filth is nourished and dies and lives again. Singapore is a treasure-trove for the student who would quickly gain knowledge of the various races of man.

Singapore as a material vantage point has its replica in the realm of the mind. The mighty spiritual network of thought, spun in varied hues of colors true and false out of diverse minds of men, and woven and interwoven to a labyrinthian tangle through long ages of man's history, seems too much for a single inquiring mind to master. The student of Scholastic Philosophy, well grounded in his own positive doctrine and intent on gaining some grasp of other trends of human thought and opposing systems, is faced with the same difficulty as is he who might be forced to journey to every corner of the earth to study the various races of man. But for the comparative ethnologist, there is Singapore; and for the student of philosophy there is at least one topic on which nearly every one of the vast network of systems of thought converge, one channel through which all the courses of human reason flow, one roadstead where he can take up his position to observe all the threads of that complicated network drawn together, distinguished by contrast one with another, ready for his classification and judgment. That topic is the Philosophy of Education.



Ships of commerce must touch at Singapore out of necessity; there is no other way. Now philosophers are members of a propagating race, a race instinct with the desire to protect its children, to perpetuate in them its heritage and traditions. Thus it is only natural that most of them in shaping their systems of thought will touch at a practical point of utmost value, at education. In the philosophy of education we find a vantage point from which to survey the great systems of thought.

The student of Scholastic Philosophy who wishes to strengthen his grasp on his own system by making use of it, and at the same time to gain some idea of opposed systems will find far more fruitful fields of collateral reading than that of the Philosophy of Education, and this for several reasons. He will have less difficulty in going to the heart of the theorist's thought, for philosophers usually bring their fundamental ideas to bear on the problems of education. He will find it easy to get the pith of the theorist's doctrine, for in dealing with a subject as practical as education, as it is looked upon today, non-Scholastic philosophers are more than usually attracted toward the good habit of saying clearly and exactly what they mean. They must produce a theory that will, somehow or otherwork, or their speculations will prove quite useless. In dealing with a practical subject like education, the student may be assisted in his judgments by the nature of the fruit of the theory. Take the extreme self-expression theory of child education, to which Bertrand Russell seems to have lent his name during his recent stay in St. Louis. Should the fruit of this theory be a character dominated by selfishness when it might have shone golden in self-sacrifice; further, should that character tend to free love, companionate marriages, and the like, ways of living which are so detrimental to the individual and the race as to issue in wrecked lives and deformed and imbecile offspring; should the fruit of the theory be all this, then the student of Scholastic Philosophy has good grounds to suspect the very foundations of the theory.

The greatest advantage of collateral reading on this subject is that the student is able to uncover, in a surprisingly short period of time, objections against many of his outstanding Scholastic theses. Even in such work as "The Philosophy of Education," by Henry H. Horne, who manages to preserve much of his common sense, the discerning student will have opportunity to check three or four statements on a single page for distinction or negation in conformity with theses in widely separated parts of his course. Although the positive principles of our psychology, ethics, and criteriology are the ones most frequently brought into play, here is an example of the use of a thesis of Cosmology. Far from disputing the relative merits of monism and dualism, Dr. Horne on several occasions takes monism for granted and discusses its relative merits in its spiritualistic and materialistic aspects. Thus, on pages 57, 93, 103, and 263, the student may refute the opinions of the author by use of his thesis on monism. Again, how would the student go about dealing with this passage, taken from page 272: "God is the self-conscious unity of all reality .... There is the infinite subject, the thinker, the I, the Father, who does not differ nor exist apart from the infinite Object, the thought, the Me, the Son .... and there is the concrete unity of both aspects in one Being, the Spirit."

There is a second reason for fostering the study of this branch of Philosophy. We have often entertained the idea that the world would be bettered by knowing more about Scholasticism. Efforts to bring this about will amount to



our seeking control of the world of thought, toward which activity we might once take an idea from Singapore. Many years ago Great Britain set out to gain control of the great network of commerce to which we likened the network of human thought. To-day Great Britain controls a great part of that network; how did she gain her position?

It is instructive to observe on a map of the world the various necks of sea through which the bulk of world commerce passes. Singapore is one of them; Ceylon, Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, Gibraltar, and the Panama Canal are the others, over all but one of which the British flag is flying. In controlling the destinies of five or six knots at which the network of world commerce converges, she controls the network itself. In the case of Scholastic Philosophy, would not the shortest path to control of the world of thought lie in concentrating all forces to gain domination of the five or six vantage points at which that vast network converges? Certainly a great deal of work has already been done, but perhaps the having of very definite objectives such as these well in mind might serve to aid in directing the good fight. There can be no enlarging of this idea here, nor a naming of the five or six Singapores, but this alone, that the Philosophy of Education is one of them, and that any effort by writing or speaking to dominate this field should be of benefit to the entire system of Scholastic Philosophy.

Perhaps the work most needed today is a general college text on the subject. This might take the form of a series of chapters suitable for the basis of a lecture course, drawing the material for philosophizing from the a priori sources of our immutable principles and the a posteriori sources such as facts gleaned from the sciences of physiology, biology, sociology, and psychology, and finally combining these facts and their resultants into a philosophy of education, not forgetting such features as practical applications to the types of schools and callings of life which our students know best. A cursory glance reveals only three books that might be in the least considered to cover this field. 'The Science of Education in its Sociological and Historical Aspects,' by the scholar Otto Willmann, is really a source book in its narrowed field. Then we have 'The Philosophy of Education,' by Doctor Shields of the Catholic University of America, presenting a somewhat disordered array, the usual characteristic where unconnected lectures and articles are done over into book form and in some cases opposing theories that are rather out of date today, and 'Fundamentals of Pedagogy,' by the Rev. James Higgins, more of an outline for personal study than a text book.

The words of V. R. Fr. Matthew Germing, "By all means let our men look forward to writing text books" (1) might be applied for two reasons to the Philosophy of Education, and that work, with the single exception of Fr. Swickerath's large volume, has not been presented in anything like text book form. Dr. Shields covers Jesuit Education in a paragraph. And, furthermore, present preparation for such writing in later life would take the form of the very beneficial "writing our philosophy" so often presented to us as a splendid method of philosophy review and general discipline.

I have covered much territory at the risk of apparaent shallowness, and there is much remaining to be said by way of filling in the outline. But these two facts will, I hope, stand clear; that the Philosophy of Education is a very fertile field for collateral reading in philosophy, and that any work done toward gaining command of that field of thought would be a real service to Scholastic Philosophy and to the world.

(1) Classical Bulletin, Oct., 1926



# CURRENT REFERENCES

THESE references are intended as a help to the student in building up his reference system to worthwhile current philosophical literature. Articles noted are all from the scholastic viewpoint. Several of the editors have found a cooperative system of collecting references helpful; we hope that other students, too, may profit from the collection. We cordially invite all of our readers to inform us of any interesting or valuable articles, reviews, or new books which we may have overlooked.

## ARTICLES

### CRITERIOLOGY

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 The Claims of Commonsense H. C. D'Arcy Dublin Review- Oct., 1927

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### Ethics

- Norma honestatis ad mentem Divi Thomae E. Elter, S. J. Gregorianum, Sept., '27  
 Catholic Philosophy Applied to Catholic Education  
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 A. E. Taylor Dublin Review, July, 1927, 17

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 John Murray Thought, Sept., 1927, 215  
 The Greek Witness to the Immortality of the Soul  
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 The Psychologists Discuss Motion C. I. Doyle, S. J. America, Nov. 19, '27, 133

### History of Philosophy and Miscellaneous

- Neo-Scholasticism and Outside Philosophers  
 Bertram C. A. Windle Homiletic and Pastoral Rev., Nov., 1927, 143  
 A Triangular Duel (Belloc, Wells, and Keith) Windle Commonweal, July 13, '27  
 The Sequence of Studies in the Philosophy Course Rudolph Bantas  
 Nat. Cath. Ed. Ass. Bulletin, Nov., 1927, 620  
 An Introductory Study of Errors and Fallacies F. A. Walsh New Schol., Oct., 1927  
 Chronicle: The State of Philosophy in Italy in 1926  
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 Primer of the Principles of Social Science By Michael Cronin  
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Thought, Sept. 1927
- Birth Control Ethics H. Davis, S.J.  
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- Catholic Church and Philosophy Vincent Mc Nabb, O. P.  
Thought, Sept., 1927
- The New Scholasticism for the past year; and the foundation of the American Catholic Philosophical Association  
Gregorianum, Sept., 1927, 464 (by Leo Keeler, S. J.)
- Forms of Individuality E. Jordan  
A modern view of the basis of ethics.  
New Scholasticism, Oct., 1927, 356
- The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge G. I. Lewis  
New Scholasticism, Oct., 1927, 362
- The Philosophy of the Recent Past R. B. Perry  
New Scholasticism, Oct., 1927, 363
- The Logic of Modern Physics P. W. Bridgman  
New Scholasticism, Oct., 1927, 364
- The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century C. H. Haskins  
New Scholasticism, Oct., 1927, 367

N. B. The New Scholasticism also contains the analytical contents of thirty four current philosophical and psychological magazines.

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#### THE SEQUENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (Continued)

theory should be studied in the sequence in which it developed in Aristotle's mind. Now, as everyone knows, the doctrine first occurred to him in his physical treatises where he introduces it to explain change or becoming. Only later is the doctrine applied to being as such and thus given its universal character. To reverse the order in the study of Aristotelian thought is to lay one's self open to the total or partial misunderstanding of the central tenet of peripateticism.

The avowed defenders of the strict logical presentation (Lepidi, T. Pesch, De Maria, and Coffey, among others) often insist that, as natural philosophy is dependent on metaphysical principles, the science that treats these, Ontology, should be studied first. The answer is that such principles as will find application may be treated in a summary way before entering upon the study of natural philosophy, and their more scientific elaboration postponed until after Cosmology and Psychology. Mercier even advocates the division of Logic and Criteriology on this plan into an elementary treatise to contain a brief exposition of the more important notions, and a more advanced study to follow natural philosophy.

It should be noted that both Fr. Baudas and Fr. Vogt, who discussed the paper at the Detroit meeting, speak from their experience in the customary two year seminary course. The three year course with natural philosophy in the second year and Special Questions of Metaphysics in the latter half of third year seems to strike a happy mean, while obviating, at least partially, the pedagogical difficulties complained of. Comments on this question by the professors of philosophy would prove interesting and serviceable to our readers.



# MR. DEWEY'S EPISTEMOLOGY

By Leo C. Brown

Mr. Dewey has been called America's first original philosopher. His system is often taken as the index of American thinking, and has largely become the basis of that Democracy in Education which is the ideal of contemporary public teaching.

Mr. Brown's article discusses Dewey's idea of truth.

In 1903 or thereabouts the system of philosophy known as Instrumentalism was first introduced into American philosophical discussion. Its adherents were chiefly the Chicago School, a group centering around the philosophical department of the University of Chicago, of whom, Mr. John Dewey, the founder of the school and author of the system, was the recognized leader.

While the system was never widely held, and today is not taught as a theoretical philosophy outside of Columbia University - where Mr. Dewey has been since 1904 - yet it would be easy to under estimate its importance. Its influence has been felt in many departments of thought, - and especially in the field of educational theory. This last circumstance is perhaps due not only to the fact that the literature

of Instrumentalism, which is relatively abundant, has often direct bearing on the theory of both ethical and intellectual education, but also to Mr. Dewey's close association with Columbia University Teachers' College, which through its graduates has for a number of years exercised a powerful influence upon educational thought in this country.

Instrumentalism professes to be a dynamic philosophy. A knowledge of Mr. Dewey's attitude towards older philosophies when forming his system will help to understand this phrase. Mr. Dewey, who came to Instrumentalism through Hegelian Idealism fell into the mistake of regarding all the important philosophers of the past as idealists. Because they in some manner or other taught that Ultimate Reality was changeless, and that perfect knowledge was knowledge of the Changeless, he felt that no room was to be found in their philosophies for knowledge of a changing thing. And as the most prominent characteristic of our universe is change, such "static" philosophies, he reasoned, were of no practical use to us. A new system of knowledge which could cope with this problem of change was imperative. In formulating this new system and attempting to stress the element of change in the universe, Mr. Dewey passes over entirely the dualistic middle ground of a knower whose mind truly mirrors external reality, and makes knowledge itself a variable thing by reducing it to a process, "the active process of thinking." This new knowledge in contrast to the "static" philosophies which Mr. Dewey rejects is dynamic.

The character of this active process is made clear from a consideration of three fundamental concepts of the system, thought, idea, and truth.

Thought, according to Instrumentalism, is only an attempt to solve

the problems of life. Man, according to Mr. Dewey, when treading the even tenor of his way does not think, but acts. Difficulties occasion thinking when they impede action, and thought is the only means through the maze to another period of unimpeded action. "Thinking is a method of reconstructing experience as the indispensable way of defining a problem, of forcing home a definite sense of where the difficulty lies.... Specific and wide observation of facts corresponds not only with a vague sense of a difficulty, but with some vague sense of the meaning of the difficulty.... It is a kind of anticipation or prediction of what is to come." This limitation of the reference of thought to the future alone, and this regarding of thought as a method or process of reconstructing experience makes thought necessarily experimental.

Consistent with this view of thought the idea becomes the plan, or hypothesis, or guess at the future which a man uses as an instrument - hence the name Instrumentalism - in the solution of the problem.

The pragmatic conception of truth is but a logical deduction from these definitions of thought and idea. Mr. Dewey states the case very well. He writes: "If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of a given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in the accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail ... they are false, By their fruits ye know them. That which guides truly is true."

The far-reaching results of such an unstable and unreliable truth are immediate and evident. A critic of the system might say that not only does it "abolish all rigid dogmas from the world," - to use Mr. Dewey's words - but with them banishes all true knowledge, security and progress. Since even the simplest statement, he would argue, could not be uttered as a fact, we would be cast into a welter of universal experiment from which there would be no escape, and in which no results could be discernible, for no multiplication of experiments could give certitude of any fact - not even of the data of the experiments, nor even that the experiments had been performed. Civil law, justice, moral obligation of any kind - all are impossible for they presuppose the truth of certain fixed principles.

The chaos which would be the inevitable result of the adoption and consistent interpretation of this philosophy is a telling argument against it, but the objection that Instrumentalism supposes for its operation the commonplace type of idea which it so explicitly rejects is more fundamental. It is urged, by those who offer this objection, that the instrumental notion of idea, a hypothesis for future action based upon past experience, is an impossibility unless the results of experience are represented to the mind by some mental act which truly re-presents the past - call the act what you will. Again it is insisted that a man, before he can judge whether his plan has met with success or failure, must apprehend the results of the experiment; and the mental concepts which bridge-over the gulf between the mind and the results must be truly representative of the facts. Otherwise this criterion of "workability" is useless. But both these types of representative acts are no more nor less than the kind of idea which Instrumentalism rejects; and they imply a fixed truth and a fixed criterion of truth.



This objection would undoubtedly be met with the response that it misunderstands Instrumentalism and is based upon the supposition that knowledge and the known are different, while Instrumentalism avoids this dualism by making knowledge not the possession of any mind, but an act. Knowledge is knowing, and knowing is a method or process of reconstructing environment. While this aspect of the philosophy suggests new and perplexing difficulties, it does not seem to destroy the force of the original objection. If any meaning attaches to the explanation of thought as a method of reconstructing environment on the basis of an idea or hypothesis which is the result of past experience, there must be in the thought process at least three distinct references - one to the past, one to the future, and one to the present situation. If there is no reference in the process to past experience, it is difficult to see how the hypothesis can be based upon experience; if there is no perception of the present situation as well as of the forecast of the future, a direction of the present situation towards the goal suggested by the forecast is impossible. These references to, or perceptions of past experience and the present situation are ideas (understood in the ordinary sense) and seem to justify the assertion of the critic that Instrumentalism requires for its operation a type of ideas which it rejects.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Dewey, in abandoning an excessive idealism, adopted a philosophy which is open to <sup>just</sup> as many objections and is little more helpful in furnishing the basis of scientific and social progress for which he sought. How does he regard the scholastic solution of the problem of Knowledge? We do not know, for Aristotle and St. Thomas, though considered, were misunderstood. It would be interesting to know, however, why Mr. Dewey passed over the vulgar philosophy of the knower and the known, or what difficulties such a philosophy would have offered to a knowledge of change, or to scientific progress.

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#### SOME REASONS FOR THE UNPOPULARITY OF FINAL CAUSES

"When Voltaire, who was, however, as he calls himself, a final causist, wrote in Candide, 'Noses are made to bear spectacles; let us also wear spectacles', he said nothing more pleasant than some of the assertions of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre in his Studies and in his Harmonies of Nature. Thus, according to Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, 'dogs are usually of two opposite colors, the one light and the other dark, in order that, whenever they may be in the house, they may be distinguished from the furniture, with the color of which they might be confounded.' Again, 'Wherever fleas are, they jump on white colors. This instinct has been given them, that we may the more easily catch them.' Bernardin also informs us that 'the melon has been divided into sections by nature for family eating; the pumpkin, being larger, can be eaten with one's neighbors'. Buckland, an English author, asks why the lamb is eaten by the wolf, and replies: 'We have here a proof of the goodness of Providence, for thereby it escapes sickness and old age'.

"Such apologies for Providence make more atheists than believers; at the most, they might be excusable when addressed to children, but philosophy is meant to speak to men. If we sum up what is common in all the abuses we have just instance, we shall see that the error does not consist in admitting final causes, but in assuming false ones"



# NEWS and ACTIVITIES

## AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

The third annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association will take place this year at Holy Cross College, Worcester, Mass., December 27 and 28. The following is the program for the meeting.

First Day.	Some notes on Modern Ideas of 'Matter'	Sir Bertram Windle
	Professor Whitehead's Conception of an Event	J.A. McWilliams, S.J.
	Intimations of Kant in the Philosophy of Locke	Michael J. Mahony, S.J.
	Science and Philosophy	Roudolph G. Bandas
	The President's Address	Edward A. Pace
Second Day	The Place of Authority in Philosophy	Ignatius Smith
	According to St. Thomas	
	St. Thomas and the Ethical Basis of	William F. Roemer
	International Law	Berard Vogt
	The Franciscan School	
	Business Meeting	

## OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATION

President	Edward A. Pace
Vice-President	Charles C. Miltner
Secretary-Treasurer	James H. Ryan
Executive Council	
John F. McCormick, S.J.	- Ignatius Smith - Jules A. Baisnee
Francis V. Concoran	- Sister Mary Verda

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## HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY CLASS

The following papers on the history of ancient and Scholastic philosophy are being presented this term in the History of Philosophy class.

Mr. Kruger - The Immortality of the Soul in Ancient Philosophy.	Mr. Toomey - Roman Philosophy.
Mr. Ruth, Cr. - The Magarians.	Mr. Doyle - Origen.
Mr. Lehman, Cr. - The Stoics.	Mr. Prendergast - Tusculan Disputations.
Mr. Newell - The Epicurians.	Mr. Orford - Cicero's De Officiis.
Mr. Ernewein, Cr. - Plato's Theory of Knowledge.	Mr. Smith - Neo-Platonism.
Mr. Loftus - Peripatetic Philosophy.	Mr. Dietrich, Cr. - Saint Augustine.
Mr. Brunck, Cr. - The Manicheans.	Mr. Mahoney - John Scotus Erigena.
Mr. Ruetz, Cr. - Gnosticism.	Mr. Norbert Dentinger, Cr. - Theodicy of Saint Anselm.
	Mr. Leander Dentinger, Cr. - William of Champeaux.



Mr. Brown - Alexander of Hales.  
 Mr. Witte - The School of Chartres.  
 Mr. Cavanaugh - The Natural Sciences  
     in Saint Thomas' Time.  
 Mr. Gschwend - The Aquinian Adapta-  
     tion of Aristotle.

Mr. Dietz - John Duns Scotus.  
 Mr. Murphy - Teutonic and Latin Genius  
     in Scholasticism.  
 Mr. Harkins - Unicity of True Philosophy  
 Mr. Morrison - Scholasticism in Germany  
     at the Eve of the Reformation.

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#### EPITOMIZING CREATION

Fr. Bellperch writes from St. Xavier's, Cincinnati: "I clipped Mr. Wuellner's summary of Theodicy. It's just things like that THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is helpful for. When teaching the subject you haven't time to work on any one phase of it, but have to range over the whole field in the course of one year. Having it in the tabloid form like that is good for two or three lectures any time you want to get away from the text for a bit."

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#### ENTROPY \* THE END OF LIFE (Continued)

inoperative for all its treasure chests will have been rifled. All work, all life, all mankind must cease in that terrible night wherein no man can work. At that date we shall still have the matter of the universe, perhaps scattered through space, perhaps compacted in one huge lump, nothing but helpless, inert matter bearing the signs and scars of the toils and aspirations and sorrows of men. Some slight molecular heat will still exist, and matter may retain its properties of inertia, rotation, and gravity of which science has little to say. But what a bleak world without life, that only true music of the spheres!

On the basis of facts here presented we see that the world through the process of entropy is scheduled to end. In the second part of this discussion to appear next month, we will consider some of the schemes whereby modern scientists here and there try to escape this subject so appalling to materialists, naturalists and monists of almost every description.

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#### IMPRESSIONS OF MINOR LOGIC (Continued)

protest against the Latin language. The world, at that time, found in Cicero and Lucretius, a more attractive way of treating philosophy. Here philosophy was not separated from man, it was not philosophy ut sic, it was not a collection of text book truths; it was man's reaction to these truths, his discovery, his attitude, emotional and intellectual, toward them.

This translation into every-day speech, then, is not a question of language. It is more a matter of digestion, of making philosophy a part of oneself, of getting in touch with the realities behind the words and letting the whole man react. Half the matter of bringing philosophy out of book cases and colleges seems to be in this humanizing process. To the text book writers, then belong the honor of having brought Minor Logic down from heaven; but they have done little toward making it welcome at the clubs, tea tables and assemblies. This is our work.

